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CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS: MAINTAINING
A STRONG COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT*
MICHAEL S. BARR1
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) has helped to revital-
ize low- and moderate-income communities and provided expanded
opportunities for low- and moderate-income households. Recent
regulatory steps aimed at alleviating burdens on banks and thrifts are
unwarranted, and may diminish small business lending as well as
community development investments and services. This policy brief
explains the rationale for CRA, demonstrates its effectiveness, and
argues that the recent regulatory proposals should be withdrawn or
significantly modified.
INTRODUCTION
In 2004, two of the four federal banking regulatory agencies
pulled out of a joint CRA rulemaking process. First the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) made a unilateral announcement that the
agency was going to curtail CRA examinations for nearly 90 per-
cent of thrifts that it regulates, treating those institutions holding
less than $1 billion in assets as "small," and the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) proposed a similar rule for banks
that it regulates. 2 The Federal Reserve Board and the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency initially balked at this move.3 A few
* Copyright © 2005 the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program.
Reprinted with permission. The text and format of individual footnotes is unchanged.
1. The author is assistant professor of law at the University of Michigan Law
School, a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy
Program, and former deputy assistant secretary for community development policy at
the U.S. Treasury Department. This brief is based on "Credit Where it Counts: The
Community Reinvestment Act and its Critics," forthcoming in New York University
Law Review.
2. See OTS, Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,155
(Aug. 18 2004); FDIC, Community Reinvestment, 69 Fed. Reg. 51,611 (Aug. 20, 2004).
3. Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, "Board's
Intention to Withdraw Proposed Amendments to Community Reinvestment Act Regu-
lations" (July 16, 2004); Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
"OCC Will Withdraw CRA Regulatory Proposal" (July 16, 2004).
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months later, OTS proposed to let any savings and loan, regardless
of size, opt out of the investment and service tests under CRA. 4
Then, in February 2005, the Fed, the OCC, and the FDIC all agreed
to raise the small bank threshold to $1 billion but added a new
"community development test" for institutions with between $250
million and $1 billion in assets.5
At bottom, debate over these changes revolves around com-
peting views of the underlying purposes of CRA, as well as its costs
and benefits. This brief thus explores the background and opera-
tion of CRA, then demonstrates that CRA has helped low- and
moderate-income households at low cost, and finally examines the
current policy debate and provides policy recommendations.
BACKGROUND ON CRA
The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (CRA) encourages
federally insured banks and thrifts to meet the credit needs of the
communities that they serve, including low- and moderate-income
areas, consistent with safe and sound banking practices. Federal
banking agencies examine banks periodically on their CRA per-
formance and rate the institutions. Regulators consider a bank's
CRA record in determining whether to approve that institution's
application for mergers with, or acquisitions of, other depository
institutions. Banks and thrifts must have a satisfactory CRA record
if they, or their holding companies, are to engage in newly author-
ized financial activities, such as certain insurance and securities
functions.
Changes to CRA regulations issued in 1995 focused evalua-
tions on objective performance measures rather than previously
used process-oriented factors. 6 These regulations require large
banks and thrifts to disclose information about their small-business,
small-farm, and community-development lending. The regulations
provide for tailored examinations of large banks, small banks, and
wholesale or limited-purpose institutions that more closely align
4. Community Reinvestment Act-Community Development, Assigned Ratings,
69 Fed. Reg. 68,257, 68,262 (proposed Nov. 24, 2004).
5. See Joint Press Release [OCC & FDIC], "Federal Banking Agencies Propose
Revisions to Community Reinvestment Act Regulations" (Feb. 22, 2005); Press Re-
lease, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Feb. 24, 2005 (joining
proposal).
6. On CRA regulations, see generally 12 CFR 25 (applying to nationally-
chartered banks), 12 CFR 228 (applying to state-chartered banks), and 12 CFR 563e
(applying to thrifts).
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with the business strategies of each institution type. Large banks
are evaluated on a three-part test of their lending, investments, and
services, while small banks undergo a streamlined review of
lending.
For large banks, the lending test accounts for 50 percent of the
bank's CRA rating and evaluates its performance in home mort-
gage, small-business, small-farm, and community-development
lending. Examiners consider the number and amount of loans to
low- and moderate-income borrowers and areas, and "innovative or
flexible lending practices." Under the investment test, which ac-
counts for 25 percent of the bank's CRA grade, the agency evalu-
ates the dollar amount of the bank's investments, investment
innovation, and its responsiveness to community needs. Under the
service test, which makes up the remaining 25 percent of the bank's
evaluation, the agency analyzes "the availability and effectiveness
of a bank's systems for delivering retail banking services and the
extent and innovativeness of its community development services."
The agency assesses an institution's record under these tests in light
of the "performance context" in which the institution is operating,
including economic and market factors; the bank's capacities, con-
straints, and business plans; and "the performance of similarly situ-
ated lenders."
Since enactment, CRA has been, and remains today, the sub-
ject of extensive debate. Many legal scholars vigorously question
the theoretical and empirical claims that motivated CRA, and many
also advocate eliminating the law.7 These critics argue that CRA is
trying to address a nonexistent problem, and that even if interven-
tion is warranted, CRA is an inappropriate tool. Many critics also
suggested that CRA was having little, if any, positive effect, and at
a high cost. However, a forthcoming article systematically rebuts
these prior criticisms of CRA and lays a solid theoretical and em-
pirical foundation for the act. 8 Those findings are summarized
here.
7. See, e.g., Jeffery W. Gunther, "Should CRA Stand for 'Community Redun-
dancy Act?"' Regulations 23 (3) (2000): 56-60; Jeffrey M. Lacker, "Neighborhoods and
Banking." Economic Quarterly 81 81 (2) (1995): 13-38; Jonathan R. Macey and Geof-
frey P. Miller, "The Community Reinvestment Act: An Economic Analysis." Virginia
Law Review 79 (291) (1993): 291-348; Lawrence J. White, "The Community Reinvest-
ment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction." Fordham Urban Law
Journal 20 (281) (1993): 281-291.
8. Michael S. Barr, "Credit Where it Counts: The Community Reinvestment Act
and its Critics." New York University Law Review 80 (101) (2005).
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CRA REASONABLY ADDRESSES MARKET FAILURES IN Low-
INCOME COMMUNITIES
At its core, CRA helps to overcome market failures in low-
income communities. By fostering competition among banks in
serving low-income areas, CRA generates larger volumes of lend-
ing from diverse sources, and adds liquidity to the market, decreas-
ing the risk of each bank's loan. Encouraged by the law, banks and
thrifts have developed expertise in serving low-income communi-
ties, and they have created innovative products that meet the credit
needs of these areas with manageable risks.
These market innovations have taken several forms. Banks
and thrifts have engaged in special marketing programs to targeted
communities; experimented with more flexible underwriting and
servicing techniques to serve a broader range of households, and
funded credit counseling for borrowers. Many larger institutions
have developed specialized units that focus on the needs of low-
and moderate-income communities. Others have formed partner-
ships with community-based organizations and community develop-
ment financial institutions (CDFIs). CDFIs provide local expertise
and financial education, and assume portions of risk that banks do
not want to bear. Spurred in part by the CRA investment test,
banks have invested in CDFIs in record numbers, strengthening
their ability to serve low-income markets.
CRA also facilitates coordination among banks to reduce in-
formation costs. Because the law requires all insured depositories
to lend in their communities, it reduces "free rider" problems. It
has spurred the development of multi-bank community develop-
ment corporations and loan consortia to serve low- and moderate-
income communities more effectively. Moreover, banks get CRA
consideration for both originating and purchasing loans, creating a
trading system. Institutions can also get credit under the CRA in-
vestment test for purchasing loan securities. The development of
this secondary market has increased liquidity and transparency.
A positive lending cycle has thus begun in many communities
once ignored by mainstream lenders. Under CRA, lenders know
that other banks will be making loans to a community, reducing all
institutions' liquidity risk, speeding the gathering and dissemination
of information, and producing positive information externalities.
Experience suggests that increased lending to low-income commu-
nities has occurred and has not led to the kind or the extent of
unprofitable, excessively risky activity predicted by critics.
[Vol. 29:11
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Studies have found evidence that CRA improved access to
home mortgage credit for low-income borrowers during the 1990s,
as CRA regulatory intensity increased. 9 Research by Brookings
and Harvard's Joint Center for Housing Studies found that, be-
tween 1993 and 1999, depository institutions covered by the CRA
and their affiliates made over $800 billion in home mortgage, small
business, and community development loans to low- and moderate-
income borrowers and communities.10 The number of CRA-eligi-
ble mortgage loans increased by 39 percent between 1993 and 1998,
while other loans increased by only 17 percent. Even excluding af-
filiates, banks increased their lending to low- and moderate-income
borrowers and areas by 10 percent over this period, compared with
no growth at all for these lenders in their other markets. As a re-
sult, the share of all mortgage lending by CRA-covered institutions
and their affiliates directed to these borrowers and areas increased
from 25 to 28 percent.
A series of factors beyond CRA contributed to these gains.
Strong economic growth and low inflation during the 1990s led to
rapid income growth, low unemployment rates, and low real inter-
est rates. Innovation helped drive down the costs of lending. Con-
solidation in the financial services sector enhanced competition
among national players with economies of scale and scope. And
other laws-such as fair lending and secondary mortgage market
regulations-operated in intensified ways during this period.
Controlling for the effects of these factors, however, CRA
9. See Michael S. Barr and others, "The Community Reinvestment Act," in C.
Guene and E. Mayo, eds., Banking and Social Cohesion: Alternative Responses to a
Global Market (Charlbury, Oxfordshire: Jon Carpenter, 2001); Robert B. Avery and
others, "Trends in Home Purchase Lending: Consolidation and the Community Rein-
vestment Act." Federal Reserve Bulletin 85 (1999); Robert B. Avery and others,
"Credit Risk, Credit Scoring, and the Performance of Home Mortgages." Federal Re-
serve Bulletin 82 (1996); Douglas D. Evanoff and Lewis M. Siegal, "CRA and Fair
Lending Regulations: Resulting Trends in Mortgage Lending." Economic Perspectives
20 (1996); Michael LaCour-Little, "Does the Community Reinvestment Act Make
Mortgage Credit More Widely Available? Some New Evidence Based on the Perform-
ance of CRA Mortgage Credits." Conference paper presented at the Midyear Meeting
of the American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association meeting, Washington,
May 4, 1998.
10. Robert E. Litan and others, "The Community Reinvestment Act After Finan-
cial Modernization: A Baseline Report" (U.S. Treasury Department, 2000); Robert E.
Litan and others, "The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Modernization:
A Final Report" (U.S. Treasury Department, 2001). For further analysis of these re-
ports, see Eric Belsky, Michael Schill, and Anthony Yezer, "The Effect of the Commu-
nity Reinvestment Act on Bank and Thrift Home Purchase Mortgage Lending"
(Harvard University Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2001).
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lenders increased their CRA-eligible home purchase lending faster
than those not regulated by CRA from 1993 to 1999.11 The Joint
Center concluded: "CRA-regulated lenders originate a higher pro-
portion of loans to lower-income people and communities than they
would if CRA did not exist."' 12 By one estimate, the Joint Center
found that CRA's effect on increasing home mortgage lending to
low-income borrowers was equivalent to a 1.3 percentage point de-
crease in unemployment. Another study found that CRA boosts
the number of small businesses that can access credit by four to six
percent, increasing payrolls and reducing bankruptcies-without
crowding out other financing available to small businesses or ad-
versely affecting bank profitability or loan performance.' 3 In sum,
recent evidence shows that CRA provides important benefits to
low-income communities.
Critics of CRA assert that it leads to unprofitable lending. But
the weight of evidence suggests otherwise. In a Federal Reserve
Board survey of CRA-covered institutions, most responded that
CRA lending was profitable or marginally profitable, and not
overly risky. 14 Pushing further into low-income markets has not
weakened banks' profitability and soundness. In the small "special
programs" that serve as banks' CRA laboratories, most institutions
reported a net charge-off rate of zero for loans made under these
programs.
CURRENT POLICY DEBATE AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Much of the current debate focuses not on the profitability of
CRA lending, but on banks' and thrifts' costs for complying with
CRA regulations. Yet reforms put into place in 1995 reduced com-
pliance costs for all banks and streamlined CRA regulations even
further for the smallest institutions. In 2002, the Independent Com-
munity Bankers of America surveyed its membership about the
11. Litan and others, "The Community Reinvestment Act After Financial Mod-
ernization: A Final Report"; Belsky, Schill, and Yezer, "The Effect of the Community
Reinvestment Act on Bank and Thrift Home Purchase Mortgage Lending."
12. Harvard University Joint Center for Housing Studies, "The 25th Anniversary
of the Community Reinvestment Act: Access to Capital in an Evolving Financial Ser-
vices System" (2002).
13. Jonathan Zinman, "Do Credit Market Interventions Work? Evidence from
the Community Reinvestment Act" (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2002).
14. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, The Performance and
Profitability of CRA-Related Lending, report submitted to the Congress pursuant to
Section 713 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, July 17, 2000.
[Vol. 29:11
HeinOnline  -- 29 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 16 2006-2007
CREDIT WHERE IT COUNTS
cost of CRA regulation. 15 Although the study is designed to high-
light the high compliance costs of CRA, the data reported in the
study suggest otherwise. The mean employee cost for CRA compli-
ance was $84,445 per year for small banks (average assets of $216
million) and about $30,000 more per year for larger "community"
banks (average assets of $666 million). Average CRA employee
costs as a percentage of assets were thus negligible-0.017 percent
for larger "community" banks, and 0.039 percent for small banks.
Under the regulatory agencies' new plans, banks and thrifts
with less than $1 billion in assets would be considered "small" for
purposes of CRA, and thus exempt from the investment and ser-
vices tests applicable to large banks, exempt from small business
loan data disclosure, and subject to a streamlined lending test.
Even banks and thrifts that are part of mammoth holding compa-
nies would be considered small, as long as the bank or thrift itself-
not the holding company-held less than $1 billion in assets. By
contrast, under current law, banks and thrifts are considered small
if they have assets of $250 million or less and are independent, or
are part of a holding company with under $1 billion in bank and
thrift assets.
This section first discusses the reasons for maintaining CRA's
basic framework. Next, it explains why proposals to raise the small
bank threshold, and the OTS proposal abandoning the investment
and service tests, are ill-conceived. Finally, it comments on the pro-
posal by the Federal Reserve Board, OCC, and the FDIC to add a
"community development" test for the institutions that would be
considered "intermediate small banks." The analysis leads to four
policy recommendations regarding the regulators' recent proposals.
1. Maintain CRA's Basic Framework
The CRA regulations have worked exceedingly well in ex-
panding access to credit-far more so than the authors of the 1995
revisions could have expected. The Fed's study suggests that this
significant expansion of credit has come at a relatively modest cost,
if any, in terms of performance and profitability. Moreover, the
costs to banks, and to the agencies, of changing the regulations
15. Grant Thornton LLP, Independent Community Bankers of America, "The
High Cost of Community Bank CRA Compliance: Comparison of 'Large' and 'Small'
Community Banks" (2002). The ICBA surveyed banks with assets up to $2 billion,
rather than the $1 billion asset level in the proposed rule. The ICBA survey had only a
28 percent response rate and thus may not be representative of similar institutions.
2006]
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could be high.16 It has taken quite some time for banks and the
agencies to work through complicated interpretive issues, opera-
tional and information system problems, and the training of bank
employees and agency examination staff. Community-based orga-
nizations, state and local governments, and other bank partners
have organized community development activities in response, to
some degree, to the current structure of CRA. New regulations
might lead to high transition costs. It would be one thing if the
changes led to significant improvements, but as discussed below,
the proposals actually go in the wrong direction.
2. Retain the Current Definition of Small Banks
Under the agencies' plans, banks and thrifts with less than $1
billion in assets, regardless of the size of their holding company or
affiliates, would be considered "small" for purposes of CRA. The
rules would exempt nearly 94 percent of all-FDIC insured deposito-
ries from the full-scope review. 17 In effect, these institutions would
no longer be required to record or make public data on small busi-
ness lending, and would no longer be judged under the investment
or retail services tests for CRA.
Lending has rightly been the focus of a statute aimed at the
"credit needs" of communities, but investment and services play
critical roles as well in meeting credit needs and are thus appropri-
ately evaluated under CRA. Investments help build local financial
and community infrastructure, while stabilizing and broadening the
economic base of low- and moderate-income communities. Invest-
ments also help expand access to credit by enhancing the capacity
of specialized local lenders such as Community Development Fi-
nancial Institutions (CDFIs) to provide credit. By stabilizing a local
community with direct investment, banks also enable loans to be
made in the community in a more safe and sound manner.
The importance of services to the provision of credit has been
less well understood in the past, but research shows that services
play a critical role in expanding access to credit.1 8 Access to an
16. See generally Gregory Elliehausen, "The Cost of Bank Regulation: A Review
of the Evidence" (1998), online at http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/171/
ssl71.pdf [accessed April 2005].
17. Author's calculations based on FDIC, Statistics on Depository Institutions.
18. See Michael S. Barr, "Banking the Poor." Yale Journal of Law and Regulation
21 (2004): 121-327 (describing how it is more difficult to establish credit or qualify for
loan without bank account); Michael Stegman and Robert Faris, "Creating a Scorecard
for the CRA Service Test" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 2003).
[Vol. 29:11
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appropriate bank account for most low-income "unbanked" indi-
viduals could mean the opportunity for lower transaction costs,
greater consumer protection, better access to loans, and increased
savings as a cushion against financial emergency and as a predicate
for borrowing.
With respect to the asset threshold, the agencies presented no
evidence that banks between $250 [million] and $1 billion faced
special burdens from the full-scope review. The ICBA study de-
scribed above, upon which some commentators on the rule relied,
provides little justification for an exemption for full scope review
for these institutions. If particular burdens do exist, it would be
better to deal with them through modifications of the investment
and services tests, rather than eliminate the tests for those firms
entirely.
Moreover, it makes little sense to eliminate the investment and
services tests for this particular class of institutions. Regulators al-
ready have the authority to be flexible on the investment test.19 For
example, to broaden investment options for smaller firms, regula-
tors may count out-of-area investments, not just local ones. As for
the service test, small institutions often have a comparative advan-
tage in providing retail services tailored to their local communities.
These services are often vital to low- and moderate-income house-
holds, partly because such services are gateways to access to credit.
Because there is little justification for the current exemption of
small banks from the service test, it seems all the more ill-advised to
expand the category of institutions not subject to the test.
Smaller banks may be more important to small business lend-
ing, too, since smaller institutions often have a comparative advan-
tage relative to large banks in relationship lending to small
businesses. 20 When large banks merge, they often lose market
19. Ryan Trammell, "Understanding the Relationship Between Investment Test
Examination Criteria and Investment Test Ratings." Federal Reserve Bank of San
Francisco, Center for Community Development Investments (2004) (finding that quali-
tative factors, not solely investment volumes, drive CRA investment test ratings).
20. See, e.g., Robert B. Avery and Katherine A Samolyk, "Bank Consolidation
and Small Business Lending: The Role of Community Banks." Journal of Financial
Services Research 25 (2004): 291-325 (finding that small banks gain market share from
large banks during consolidations); David A. Carter, James E. McNulty, and James A.
Verbrugge, "Do Small Banks have an Advantage in Lending? An Examination of
Risk-Adjusted Yields on Business Loans at Large and Small Banks." Journal of Finan-
cial Services Research 25 (2004): 233-252 (finding that small banks have informational
advantage in evaluating small business loans); Jonathan A. Scott, "Small Business and
the Value of Community Financial Institutions." Journal of Financial Services Research
25 (2004): 207-230 (discussing small bank informational advantages).
2006]
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share in small business loans that instead are offered by local play-
ers. For these local institutions, geographic distance still matters. 21
Most small businesses rely on lenders with a local presence for
credit.22 This is consistent with a theory of informational advantage
for local creditors in assessing highly opaque small business assets
and other data. 23 Thus, it makes little sense to avoid collecting
small business data and evaluating all institutions, including small
banks and the new "intermediate small banks," on their small-busi-
ness-lending performance.
Perhaps most problematic is the proposal to ignore the asset
size of the holding company when determining whether to consider
a bank "small" for purposes of CRA. First, banks within holding
companies are less in need of regulatory "burden relief" than simi-
larly-sized independent institutions. Holding companies provide
scale economies to their subsidiaries in complying with bank regula-
tions.24 Banks that are part of holding companies face lower regu-
latory burdens from the same regulation than their non-affiliated
counterparts of similar size. Thus, affiliation should generally be
weighed, not ignored, in determining tradeoffs between regulatory
burdens and benefits.
Second, banks that are part of holding companies have availa-
ble to them the range of expertise of the holding company, which is
useful for developing programs to meet community needs under
CRA. The holding company is effectively part of the bank's per-
formance context. Along with its subsidiaries, it can offer a range
of services to the bank in helping the bank meet its CRA perform-
ance goals, such as innovative loan products, securitization, or ex-
pertise in investments. These affiliates do affect a bank's CRA
performance, and banks in larger holding companies should be as-
21. Kenneth P. Brevoort and Timothy H. Hannan, "Commercial Lending and
Distance: Evidence from Community Reinvestment Act Data." Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve Working Paper (2004) (finding that "distance is negatively associ-
ated with the likelihood of a local commercial loan being made and that deterrent effect
of distance is consistently more important, the smaller the size of the bank").
22. Myron L. Kwast and others, "Market Definition and the Analysis of Antitrust
in Banking." The Antitrust Bulletin 42 (1997): 973-995 (finding median distance at or
under six miles between small businesses and their bank providers of most credit prod-
ucts); Jonathan A. Scott and others, "Credit, Banks, and Small Business-The New
Century" (National Federation of Independent Business Research Foundation, 2003)
(finding median travel time of 6-10 minutes between small business and its bank) online
at http://www.nfib.com/object/3747922.html [accessed April 2005].
23. See, e.g., Arnoud W.A. Boot, "Relationship Banking: What Do We Know?"
Journal of Financial Intermediation 9 (2000): 7-25.
24. Elliehausen, "The Cost of Bank Regulation: A Review of the Evidence."
[Vol. 29:11
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sessed using the CRA test for large retail institutions, which effec-
tively takes account of the expertise and resources of the parent
institution.
Third, affiliate activity is critical to understanding the perform-
ance of a bank under CRA. Regulations already provide that evi-
dence of illegal credit practices, whether within the depository
institution or its affiliate (regardless of whether the bank opted to
include the affiliate in the examination) affects an institution's
CRA rating. Moreover, regulators now give CRA consideration
for "promoting" borrowers from the subprime to the prime market.
The effectiveness of this approach depends on adequate supervision
of the relationship between the bank and its affiliates to assess
whether borrowers with good credit history are "upstreamed" from
subprime affiliates and offered prime products, or conversely are
steered to higher-cost subprime products. For these reasons, affili-
ates should not be ignored when computing the size of the institu-
tion for purposes of determining the appropriate kind of CRA
examination.
3. Withdraw the OTS Plan to Eliminate the Investment and
Service Tests
The OTS plan to permit all institutions, regardless of size, to
avoid the investment and service tests is also deeply misguided.
The OTS plan essentially makes the investment and services test
optional for all institutions, without any requirement similar to the
existing "strategic plan" option that provides for input from the
public and approval by the regulators in assessing the institution's
proposed method for evaluating its performance. As discussed at
the outset, the lending test is central to a determination of whether
an institution is meeting the credit needs of the community. The
investment and service tests, however, also play critical roles. In-
vestments help to stabilize communities and build local institutions
that help banks and thrifts to expand access to credit. Services tai-
lored to low- and moderate-income consumers and communities-
including access to bank accounts-are the critical first steps to-
ward their gaining the opportunity to access credit. Both the invest-
ment and the service tests are critical to the future of CRA and
should be retained.
20061
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4. Support the Agency Proposals to add a Community
Development Test
While it remains preferable to maintain the current approach
for these "intermediate small banks" (with assets from $250 million
to $1 billion), rather than creating a new structure, the proposed
"community development test" does reduce some of the harm that
will be caused by adopting the OTS position, which simply removes
such institutions from full-scope CRA review. Under the commu-
nity development test, such banks would be evaluated on their com-
munity development lending, investment and services as a whole, in
lieu of separate investment and services tests. Community develop-
ment services would include retail services benefiting low- and
moderate-income households. An intermediate small bank could
not achieve an overall CRA rating of satisfactory unless both its
lending performance and its record under the community develop-
ment test were found to be satisfactory.
Because a bank could not achieve a satisfactory rating overall
without achieving a satisfactory rating on the proposed community
development test, the test is likely to continue to give these inter-
mediate small banks an incentive to provide a mix of community
development lending, investment and services to lower-income
communities and households. These institutions may, however,
move away from providing investments or services as a result of
dropping the individual tests, and many smaller communities lack
large banks that could fill the void. Moreover, small business lend-
ing data would no longer be recorded or made public, which might
significantly decrease incentives for these institutions to reach fur-
ther into low- and moderate-income communities to improve their
small business lending performance. Thus, any community devel-
opment test should explicitly include measures of small business
lending performance.
CONCLUSION
CRA is working for America's communities. Now is not the
time to cut it back. The agencies' recent proposals to increase the
small bank threshold, and the OTS plan to make the investment
and services tests effectively optional, should be withdrawn. If the
small bank threshold is increased, it is critical for the agencies to
continue to measure community development lending, investment,
[Vol. 29:11
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and services and to maintain the small business lending data com-
ponent of the CRA regulations for these banks and thrifts. In that
way, CRA can continue to help grow small businesses and
strengthen communities in the years ahead.
HeinOnline  -- 29 W. New Eng. L. Rev. 23 2006-2007
